Power Dynamics at the International Maritime Organization

Are international climate governance mechanisms structured to protect the most vulnerable or the most powerful?

In Whose Security are We Protecting in a Time of Climate Change? How Gender Bias Affects Human Security for Pacific Women, Elise Howard examines the structural biases that affect climate security for women in Pacific Island nations. Howard demonstrates how, despite Pacific leaders promoting human-centered security approaches over state-centric ones, gender bias persists in both global and local institutions addressing climate change.

Howard's analysis operates on two key levels. At the global level, she shows how Pacific women negotiators face marginalization at climate conferences (COPs) despite being well-represented numerically. Their contributions are often reduced to performative roles while substantive decision-making remains dominated by more powerful interests. A central insight from Howard's research is that colonial legacies have created artificial distinctions between formal/informal economies and public/private spheres that disadvantage women's work and interests. These differences still exist in modern policy frameworks, which value formal economic activities over "informal" work that women do in large numbers, even though evidence indicates that women play a key role in keeping people safe during climate crises.

Howard concludes that addressing gender equality in climate security requires examining whose security is truly being protected through institutional practices and unwritten rules—the most vulnerable or the most powerful? This question provides context for similar dynamics at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), where climate change issues are managed.

At the ISWG-GHG 18, we saw the same pattern Howard identified in climate security negotiations: structural bias potentially undermining the interests of the most vulnerable despite the numerical majority. Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and even a significant number of developed economies support a GHG levy combined with a Global Fuel Standard (GFS). However, a smaller but more powerful group appears to be attempting to shift discussions toward the J9 credit trading approach.

The IMO's GHG strategy goals will fail to deliver a just and equitable transition as long as credit prices are lower than the amount needed to invest in real long-term solutions. The credit trading scheme essentially undermines legitimate zero-emissions investments, thus creating uncertainty and promoting an extended period of so-called “transition fuels” like LNG and biofuels for longer than needed. An ambitious levy in combination with a GFS makes a stronger business case for energy transition investments in e-fuels.

The chair's actions in particular raise concerns about institutional bias: By promoting the J9 paper—despite its apparent inability to meet the IMO's stated objectives of effectively promoting energy transition and contributing to a just and equitable transition—the chair (who belongs to this smaller group) seems to be exercising disproportionate influence over the proceedings. The situation perfectly illustrates Howard's point about how institutional power can operate through unwritten rules and procedural mechanisms.

Just as Howard documented how Pacific women's important contributions to climate resilience are routinely undervalued. The ISWG-GHG 18 proceedings suggest that the policy preferences of vulnerable nations may also be ignored. The credit trading mechanism, which is basically an emissions trading system, would make it harder for SIDS and LDCs to get the stable funding they need for the things they require the most: protection against disproportionate negative impacts and support for their just transition.

The fundamental question remains the same in both contexts: are international climate governance mechanisms structured to protect the most vulnerable or the most powerful? The IMO process appears to be another example of how institutional practices can subtly reinforce existing power imbalances despite formal inclusion of all parties in decision-making.